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 Wage Di⁄erentials in Israel: Endowments,





I use a panel of cross sections income data between 1991 and 2003 to measure wage
di⁄erentials between Israeli-Arab and Jewish workers in Israel. The wage gap discov-
ered is decomposed into components corresponding to human capital, occupational
segregation, selectivity, and a residual, which may re￿ ect discrimination. The unad-
justed hourly wage gap between Arab and Jewish workers almost doubled from 40% in
1991 to 77% in 1999. By 2003, however, it had declined to 56%. The study shows large
￿ uctuations in the wage gap. Human capital di⁄erences explain a major part of the
wage gap, but its contribution is susceptible to the non-discriminatory norm adopted.
Occupational segregation accounts for about a third of the wage gap. Because sudden
changes in the underlying characteristics of the populations are not likely￿ these were
actually slightly converging over the study period￿ large part of the changes in the
wage gap are likely to be due to labor market discrimination.
￿This study bene￿tted from helpful discussions with Michael Beenstock, Joseph Zeira, Lena Edlund, and
Till von Wachter. Thanks must also go to seminar participants at Columbia University and an anonymous
referee for helpful comments. I thank the Israel Social Sciences Data Center, at the Hebrew University of
Jerusalem, for providing the main data. The generous ￿nancial support from the Falk Institute for Economic
Research in Israel is gratefully acknowledged. All remaining errors are mine.
11 Introduction
Israel is a multicultural, multiethnic society. Its population brings together Western and
Eastern Jews, foreign- and locally-born citizens, and Arabs from a range of Muslim, Chris-
tian, and Druze religious and ethnic backgrounds.1 Israeli Arab citizens constitute about
20% of the total population;2 yet despite extensive studies of ethnic wage disparities in Is-
rael (e.g., Neuman and Silber (1996), Neuman and Oaxaca (1998), and Neuman and Oaxaca
(2004b)), very little attention has been paid speci￿cally to the characteristics of this group
as workforce participants.
The literature on the Jewish-Arab wage di⁄erentials is very narrow. The main ￿ndings
of this literature are that Jewish-Arab wage gaps are very large, and the major part of this
gap is not explained by di⁄erences in individual human capital characteristics. Previous
research also provides evidence as to the large di⁄erences in the occupational distribution
between Jews and Arabs￿ Arab workers are over-represented in blue-collar jobs, but under-
represented in academic, management, and professional jobs (see Levanon and Raviv (2007)
and references therein). Most of these studies, however, base their inference on a single, or
a very few, cross section datasets (such as the census of 1995).
The objective of this chapter is to measure and document the evolution of wage gaps
1Arabs, or Israeli Arabs, mentioned here are citizens and residents of Israel. They are native-born, live,
and work in Israel, have Israeli citizenship, and share the same national institutions with the Jewish citizens.
Palestinians, living in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, are not the subject of this chapter.
2Israel￿ s total population (excluding the Gaza Strip and West Bank) was estimated at around 5 million
in the early 1990s and has steadily increased since then. In 2003 the estimated population was 6.7 million.
See the Statistical Abstract of Israel, Central Bureau of Statistics (2005).
2between Arabs and Jews in the Israeli labor market in the years 1991￿ 2003, aiming to
describe and evaluate the di⁄erent mechanisms that may be driving these gaps. It also
provides a method of measuring occupational segregation using standard wage decomposition
procedures. The study disaggregates observed wage gaps into di⁄erent components such as
human capital di⁄erences, occupational segregation, and a residual component that may
re￿ ect labor-market discrimination within occupations. It also corrects for self selection into
employment.
In addition to recording the Jewish-Arab wage gap in gross terms, this study also analyzes
patterns of change between the di⁄erent wage gap components between 1991 and 2003. I
￿nd that the Jewish-Arab hourly wage gap hovered at around 40% (of Arab hourly wage) in
the years 1991￿ 1994, peaking at 64% in 1999. Since then the hourly wage gap has decreased,
falling to 43% by the end of 2003.3 The unexplained component of the gap, resulting from
di⁄erent returns to human capital characteristics, accounted for 10%￿ 20% of the overall wage
gap in the beginning of the period but increased vastly during the late 1990s to account for
more than 60% of the gap. Occupational segregation explained 30%￿ 40% of the overall wage
gap over the entire period.
The large ￿ uctuations in the wage gap found in this study suggest that a large part
of the changes in the wage gap are likely to be the result of labor market discrimination,
because sudden changes in the wage gap are not likely to result from sudden changes in the
3The ￿gures, when recent Jewish immigrants are excluded from the samples, are 45% for 1991-1994, 77%
in 1999, and 56% in 2003.
3underlying characteristics of the populations. In fact, many of the key (observable) human
capital characteristics of Arab and Jewish workers were converging in the study period.
The chapter is organized as follows: the next section describes the methodology used to
measure wage gaps and their decompositions. Section 3 features a detailed description of




I use Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition [Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973)] in its general form
[see Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1988, 1994)], to analyze wage gaps between
Jewish and Arab workers in Israel. The method breaks wage gaps down into, ￿rst, a compo-
nent representing di⁄erentials in human capital, and second into a component representing
the e⁄ect of discrimination. Let ln(wij) = X
0
ij￿j + "ij represent the wage equation for
individual i: The decomposition is then:
G = lnWJ ￿ lnWA =
























4where Wij is the hourly wage of individual i of ethnic group j (j = J;A), Xij is a vector of
worker characteristics, A and J subscripts stand for Arabs and Jews, and upper-bars signify
averages of the di⁄erent variables (over individuals, i = 1;2;:::;N). The regressors vector,
Xij; includes years of schooling, experience, experience squared, a marital status category
(single, married, widowed, separated, and divorced), wave of immigration (relevant to Jewish
citizens only), occupational dummies, and industrial dummies.4 ^ ￿
￿
is the estimate of the
nondiscriminatory wage coe¢ cients, and G is the gross (geometric) wage gap.5 The ￿rst
term in equation 1, Q, represents the human capital component of the overall wage gap, and
D, the sum of the second and third terms, represents the discriminatory (or unexplained)
component. The nondiscriminatory wage coe¢ cient, ^ ￿
￿
, can be estimated using the sample
of Jewish workers (^ ￿J), the sample of Arab workers (^ ￿A), or the pooled sample of Jewish
and Arab workers (^ ￿P).
In this chapter I carry out the estimation under the assumption that ^ ￿
￿
= ^ ￿A or that
^ ￿
￿
= ^ ￿J.6 In doing so, I analyze the e⁄ects of two di⁄erent ￿experiments.￿First, the ￿enrich-
ment experiment (EE),￿that is, when Arabs are hypothetically assigned the average Jewish
Human Capital (HC) characteristics￿ maintaining the Arab returns to those characteristics
(^ ￿
￿
= ^ ￿A). Second, the ￿civil rights experiment (CRE),￿when Arabs are assumed to have
4The Income Surveys do not provide a direct measure of labor market experience. Consequently, I use
potential experience, de￿ned as: Experience = Age￿Schooling￿5. Moreover, using ￿type of locality￿and
￿large city￿identi￿ers in the wage equations has virtually no e⁄ect on the results.
5This is the approximate geometric wage gap. See Appendix A for a description of the di⁄erent measures
of gross wage gaps.
6The ^ ￿
￿
= ^ ￿P variation of the nondiscriminatory wage coe¢ cients is analyzed in the working version of











Figure 1: Civil Rights and Enrichment Experiments
the Jewish returns to HC, while maintaining their current average levels of HC (^ ￿
￿
= ^ ￿J).
Figure 1 depicts these theoretical experiments for one ingredient of human capital￿ for the
sake of the example, assume X to stand for years of schooling.
Point A in the graph is the current average wage and schooling for Arabs; point B shows
the current average wage and schooling for Jewish workers. As the graph is drawn, namely,
Jewish workers have higher returns to schooling, it is shown that the unexplained part of the
wage gap will be greater under the enrichment experiment than the civil rights experiment.
That is, if Arabs experience an immediate enhancement in their human capital component
( ￿ XA), to reach the average level of that of their Jewish counterparts ( ￿ XJ), the total wage
6gap will be reduced by only a small fraction of QEE; while a great portion of the gap, DEE;
will be attributed to unexplained di⁄erences in the returns to schooling.
2.2 Occupational Segregation
For the dataset in question, the average income varies widely across occupations (as well
as across ethnic groups). Therefore, even in the absence of unexplained wage gaps within
occupations, wage di⁄erences could still exist pertaining to di⁄erent distributions of Arab and
Jewish workers across employment sectors. While controlling for occupational and industrial
a¢ liation in the wage regressions would eliminate inter-occupational wage gaps, it would also
have the e⁄ect of underestimating the discriminatory component of the overall wage gap, to
the extent that occupational segregation itself derives from discrimination. This could be













the mean (log) hourly-wage of an Arab (Jewish) worker in occupation i (i = 1;2;:::;I). It






















The above illustration indicates the possibility that including occupational dummies in
the wage regressions may result in underestimating the discriminatory component of the
7overall wage gap, in the sense that the added variables would disguise labor market discrim-
ination as a human capital component.
Oaxaca decomposition does not account for group di⁄erences in group members￿occu-
pational distribution. Di⁄erent methods were suggested to measure the occupational segre-
gation component of the wage gap. For example, Brown et al. (1980) and Miller (1987) use
a multinomial logit model to estimate the distribution of one group across occupations, and
compare this with the observed distribution of the other group. Neuman and Silber (1996),
alternatively, estimate the occupational segregation component by comparing each group￿ s
share in a certain occupation with the share of that occupation in the total employed labor
force, and sum the di⁄erences over all occupations. These estimates, however, measure the
real rather than the nominal occupational segregation. That is, they look at the employment
distribution rather than its e⁄ect on wage di⁄erentials.
I use a variation of the original Oaxaca decomposition to directly measure the occupa-
tional (and industrial) segregation component of the wage gap. This method is preferred
for its simplicity, and because it does not assume any functional form of the distribution of
occupations. I include a set of occupational dummies in the wage equations, and modify
the Oaxaca decomposition by dissociating the part explained by those dummies from the
human capital component. Let the estimated wage equation be lnWj = ￿ X0
j^ ￿j + C
0
j^ ￿j;where




j] and the parameters vector ^ ￿ := [^ ￿
0
; ^ ￿
0]0 I arrive at the following decomposition:
G =
































Equation 3 accommodates the e⁄ect that di⁄erent occupational distributions have on wage
gaps. Q is the within-occupation human capital component. D is the unexplained compo-
nent. The last term, S, representing di⁄erences in the occupational distribution weighted by
a nondiscriminatory norm (hereafter ^ ￿J or ^ ￿A ), takes its place as the occupational segrega-
tion component.7
Although estimating the individual contributions of sets of dummy variables to the un-
explained component of the wage gap may produce arbitrary results, since those depend on
the dropped category, it is still true that the overall decomposition and estimated separate
contributions of dummy variables to the explained component are consistent and invariant to
any choice of the dropped category (Oaxaca and Ransom (1999)). This fact makes possible
the isolation of the occupational distribution e⁄ect from the human capital component.
It has been noted that occupational segregation can be the result of labor market dis-
crimination.8 While labor market segregation can re￿ ect barriers to entry into well-paying
7C in this study includes single-digit occupational and industrial dummies￿ to represent about 15 indus-
tries and 10 occupations. Although double-digit occupational and industrial dummies are available in the
income surveys it is very di¢ cult to make them comparable over the years￿ that is before and after 1995,
when the occupational and industrial classi￿cations were revised. The S component will, therefore, represent
both the occupational and industrial segregation, but, for simplicity, will be referred to as the ￿occupational
segregation￿component.
8As noted by Neuman and Silber (1996) (p.651, n.3), occupational segregation represents another dimen-
sion of labor market discrimination. Segregation and barriers to entrance based solely on ethnic a¢ liation,
9jobs, it can exist more neutrally as a manifestation of di⁄erent preferences. I do not further
decompose the occupational segregation component into self-selection and discrimination,
and this should be viewed as a compound e⁄ect.
2.3 Selectivity
Self-selection into employment has been proved potentially to bias the wage regression coef-
￿cients (see Heckman (1979) for more details). A consistent estimation of wage regressions
is needed to get consistent wage gap decomposition. Neuman and Oaxaca (2004a) intro-
duced di⁄erent methods for incorporating this correction into the Oaxaca decomposition.
The authors suggest di⁄erent selectivity-corrected decompositions; however, each of these
yields di⁄erent results, and their method does not help in choosing the ￿ correct￿one, as
acknowledged by the authors.9
Following Reimers (1983) I calculated the selectivity e⁄ect as a whole and the corrected
gross wage gap, then decomposed this to a human capital component, an unexplained (or
discriminatory) component, and an occupational and industrial segregation component. The
other things being equal, should be viewed as discriminatory.
Neumark (1988) expresses the same concern in other words:
The question of whether industry or occupation dummy variables should be included in regres-
sions to estimate wage discrimination hinges on the extent to which the distribution of men
and women across industries and occupations is itself a result of discrimination. p. 291.
9￿None of what has been presented here authoritatively identi￿es the ￿ correct￿decomposition... The
choice of which selectivity corrected decomposition to use is largely judgmental because it inevitably re￿ ects
value judgments about what constitutes labor market inequity.￿Neuman and Oaxaca (2004a), p. 8.
10decomposition in equation 3 is generalized as follows:
G =






































where Q; D; and S are the familiar components as de￿ned in the previous subsections. The
last term measures the selectivity e⁄ect, where ^ ￿ is the coe¢ cient of the Inverse Mills Ratio
(^ ￿) in the modi￿ed wage equations. See Neuman and Oaxaca (2004a) for discussion of
selectivity-corrected wage decomposition and the relevant terminology.
The selectivity corrected wage equations are estimated using the Heckman two-steps pro-
cedure.10 The explanatory variables in the selection equation are: schooling, dummy vari-
ables for schooling categories, capturing the ￿ sheepskin e⁄ect,￿such as high school dropouts,
high school graduates, some college, college graduates, and beyond college education, age,
age squared, marital status, and years since ￿rst marriage (with a zero value for unmar-
ried).11 This innovative variable, arguably, a⁄ects participants￿decision to join the labor
market, as more years since marriage may lower the reservation wage. The willingness to
work increases at each wage level. That is, a greater number of years since ￿rst marriage,
other things equal, may a⁄ect (increase) the probability of joining the labor market, without
a⁄ecting the worker￿ s wage.
10In the working version of this chapter, maximum likelihood estimation is used in addition to the Heckman
two-steps procedure (Asali (2006)).
11Data for the years 1996￿ 2003 include only an interval variable of year of marriage. For these periods I
impute values for the variable ￿ years since ￿rst marriage,￿using the midpoint of each interval.
113 Data
Data are drawn from the yearly income surveys conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics
in Israel for the years 1990￿ 2003. Income surveys are based on questionnaires conducted at
the household and individual levels and cover information on demographic, personal, and
labor market characteristics. The samples include Jewish and non-Jewish respondents living
exclusively in Israel￿ residents of the West Bank or the Gaza Strip are not included in the
survey. Hence, all respondents in the income survey, both Arabs and Jews, are residents and
citizens of Israel.
To identify whether the individual is an Arab or Jewish I use the ￿religion￿variable from
the income survey. This variable, however, is not detailed enough to identify individuals who
are neither Arab nor Jewish (e.g., non-Arab Christians). In the years 1991￿ 2000 the religion
variable included two categories: Jews versus non-Jews (i.e., Arabs and ￿others￿ ). In the
years 2001￿ 2004 the two categories identi￿ed by the religion variable were non-Arabs (i.e.,
Jews and ￿others￿ ) versus Arabs. ￿Others￿might refer to non-Arab Christians, people with
no religion classi￿cation, or people who simply did not report their religion. In either case
this group is very small and is not likely to have any e⁄ect on the study results.12
12In the Labor Force surveys, where the ￿religion￿ variable is more accurate￿ it reports whether the
individual is Jewish, Muslim, Christian, Druze, or ￿Other￿ ￿ I found that, within the samples of employed
men, ￿others￿constituted about 0.1%￿ 1.5% of the observations in each year of 1991￿ 2004. Yet this is not
a perfect identi￿er of non-Arab, non-Jewish individuals￿ as a ￿Christian￿can be non-Arab. Nonetheless,
Table 2.1, pp. 85￿ 86, of the Statistical Abstract of Israel 2007, shows that ￿others￿ ￿ in this case referring
to people who are neither Arab nor Jewish￿ constituted about 1.5%￿ 4.2% of the population in the years
1995￿ 2004.
12I limit the analysis to salaried, prime-aged (25￿ 65), male workers.13 Worker￿ s hourly
wage is calculated by dividing monthly income by the product of hours worked per week
and working weeks per month. I deal with outliers, in terms of hourly wage, by dropping
observations below the 1st and above the 99th percentile of the log hourly wage distribution
for each year. This procedure is more robust and meaningful than dropping observations
on a given (New Israeli Shekel, NIS) cuto⁄ point, since the analyses involve di⁄erent years
over which the currency value is not comparable. Moreover, this procedure circumvents the
problem of an a priori imposed NIS cuto⁄ point by accommodating changes in the wage
distribution over period years (Chandra (2000)).
Israel remains an immigrant society in the sense that incomers constitute a large portion
of its population. To take into consideration this fact￿ s potential e⁄ect on the results, there-
fore, in subsequent analyses I control for the period of immigration￿ which is an important
determinant of wages due to assimilation e⁄ects.14 Finally, it is important to emphasize that
sampling weights provided in the data are always used in the analyses, unless otherwise is
clearly stated. Using sample weights is not only useful for the within-year analyses, but it
makes inference based on di⁄erent cross sections (years) more comparable.15
13Data on income from self-employment are available only for recent years, and only partially; thus, the
main income variable used in the study is the income from salaried work.
14In the working version of this study I deal with the issue of immigration by excluding recent arrivals
from the analyses (Asali (2006)). While not a perfect approach, it is still insightful and suggestive, and I
will allude to its potential and actual results in subsequent analyses.
15This is especially true for 1995, when the income survey was extended to include Arabs in smaller urban
localities (with 2,000￿ 10,000 inhabitants). And for 1997, when the income survey size was doubled thanks
to using the ￿Survey of Family Expenditures￿as another source of income data. Sample weights, provided
in the data by the CBS, accommodate these changes and make the data years more comparable.
134 Results
Table 1 reports the averages of the relevant variables in the working samples, for each
investigated year. Sample weights are used to calculate variable averages in the table. As
mentioned before, I restrict the samples to employed men aged 25￿ 65. The table reports
the average hourly wage, in New Israeli Shekels (NIS) of 2000. The hourly wage gap was
increasing in the 1990s to record a maximum of 64% in 1999. The gross gap started then
declining until the end of the period, but remained above its starting level, by about 8%.
It is clear from the table that Jewish workers are highly educated, as compared to their
Arab counterparts. The di⁄erence in average schooling was about 3 schooling years in the





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































15Jewish workers are older and more experienced than Arab workers, but the di⁄erence in
average age converged from 5.5 years in the beginning of the period to about 4.5 years by
2003. Percentage of ever-married Jewish workers was higher in the beginning of the period,
to converge to that of Arabs by the end of the period. As to weekly working hours, those
were about 2 hours higher for Jewish workers, and the di⁄erence was stable over the study
period.
Tables 2￿ 6 document the main ￿ndings of the study. They present the overall wage gap
decompositions, according to the techniques discussed earlier, and under di⁄erent assump-
tions. All the estimates in those tables are signi￿cant at the 5% signi￿cance level.16
Table 2 reports results from the benchmark wage gap decomposition. The gross wage gap
(ln(WJ)￿ln(WA)) is decomposed into a human capital component, Q; and an unexplained
component, D: The variables included in the underlying regressions are found in the notes
to the table, and main coe¢ cients of these regressions are found in Table 7 and Table 8. The
increasing wage gap of the 1990s, and the peak at 1999, are clear from this table as well.
The explanatory power of human capital di⁄erences, when using the Arab wage struc-
ture as the nondiscriminatory norm, was declining from 1994 (80% of the gross gap) to 2000
(40%), to increase up to 60% in 2003. In contrast, human capital di⁄erences explained only
about 28% of the gross gap, when Jewish wage structure is used as the nondiscriminatory
norm. This result is not surprising, given the fact that we include the period of immigra-
16Basic wage regressions, on which Tables 2 and 3 are based, are reported in the appendix to this chapter,
in Tables 7, 8, 9, and 10.
16tion to Israel as an explanatory variable in the wage equations. First, all Arabs are born
in Israel￿ so, for them, all the dummies of di⁄erent periods of immigration will be zero.
Second, it is a well-documented fact that immigrants, at di⁄erent stages of the assimilation
period, get lower wages than natives. These two facts combined mean that the human capital
component in the wage gap will be lower when we use the Jewish wage structure (with neg-
ative coe¢ cients for immigration periods) rather than the Arab wage structure (with zero
immigration coe¢ cients) as the nondiscriminatory norm.17
The table also suggests that the unexplained part of the wage gap was increasing in the
1990s, and its portion from the total gap was large and increasing as well (for example 80%
of the gross gap when ￿J is used, and increasing from 20% to 60% when ￿A is used). Figure
2, based on the above table, shows these results clearly.
Figure 3 is the mirror image of the previous ￿gure (Figure 2). This ￿gures makes it clear
that the contribution of the human capital component to the wage gap, in absolute terms,
is relatively stable over the whole period. Also, the ￿gure shows this to be true regardless of
the nondiscriminatory norm assumed (￿J or ￿A).
Table 3 reports results of the wage gap decomposition, accounting for the occupational
17One speci￿cation in the working version of this chapter excludes immigrants arriving in the last twenty
years altogether from the analyses. The estimation from this ￿reduced sample￿lends support to the argument
brought here in that wage gaps are immensely higher in the reduced sample than in the full sample (Asali
(2006)). Levanon and Raviv (2007) also ￿nd that the wage gap between Jewish workers and each of Christian,
Muslim, or Druze Arab workers is higher when ￿new immigrants￿are excluded from the sample (ibid. Table
4). Moreover, I found that, if we do not control for the immigration period in the wage equations, Q and D
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Figure 3: Gross Wage Gap and the Human Capital Component (Q), ￿
￿ = ￿J;￿A
19segregation component.18 Occupational segregation refers to di⁄erent distributions of Arab
and Jewish workers over occupations and industries, nominally evaluated using the nondis-
criminatory norm.
Occupational segregation, as evident from Table 3, absorbs on average more than 60%
(75%) of the estimated human capital component of the wage gap, when ^ ￿A (^ ￿J) is used
as the nondiscriminatory norm. Occupational segregation contributed a great deal to the
wage gap. Using the Jewish wage structure, this was estimated at about 35% of the total
gap for most of the time￿ at least after 1993. Using the Arab wage structure, however, the
contribution of occupational segregation was not stable; this was declining from 1994 to 1998
and increasing thereafter. Nonetheless, on average, it explained about 37% of the total wage
gap.
If Jewish workers are concentrated in high-premia jobs and Arab workers face barriers
to entry to these jobs then, when controlling for occupational and industrial a¢ liation,
the unexplained gap should decrease more when the Jewish wage structure (￿J) is used
rather than the Arab wage structure. This is especially true if the returns to human capital
characteristics, within occupation and industry groups, are higher for Jewish workers￿ a
fact which is supported by comparing wage regression coe¢ cients from Tables 9 and 10. The
veri￿able implication of this assumption is con￿rmed in Figures 4 and 5, where, controlling
18The gross gap is ought to be identical to that from Table 2; the slight di⁄erences, however, are due to
the fact that information about occupational and industrial a¢ liation is not always available for all workers,
resulting in a slightly smaller sample than before.
20Table 2: Basic Wage Gap Decomposition
￿
￿ = ￿A ￿
￿ = ￿J
Year Gross Gap Q D Q D
1991 0.2190 0.2257 -0.0067 0.1519 0.0671
1992 0.2634 0.1165 0.1470 0.0933 0.1702
1993 0.2739 0.1713 0.1026 0.0638 0.2101
1994 0.2747 0.2282 0.0465 0.0718 0.2029
1995 0.2740 0.2040 0.0700 0.0640 0.2100
1996 0.3023 0.2081 0.0943 0.0540 0.2484
1997 0.3427 0.2039 0.1388 0.0982 0.2445
1998 0.3754 0.1762 0.1992 0.0808 0.2946
1999 0.4242 0.1793 0.2450 0.1003 0.3239
2000 0.4047 0.1679 0.2367 0.0928 0.3119
2001 0.3647 0.1918 0.1728 0.0634 0.3013
2002 0.3385 0.2006 0.1379 0.0951 0.2433
2003 0.3248 0.1979 0.1268 0.0898 0.2349
NOTE.￿ Gross gap refers to ln(1+G) (or lnWJ ￿lnWA), Q refers
to the human capital component of the wage gap, D refers to the
unexplained component of the wage gap. Results are based on
wage equations which include as regressors: schooling, experience,
experience squared, marital status, and period of immigration.
Table 3: Extended Wage Gap Decomposition
￿
￿ = ￿A ￿
￿ = ￿J
Year Gross Gap Q D S Q D S
1991 0.2188 0.0893 0.0390 0.0904 0.0775 0.0089 0.1323
1992 0.2609 0.0346 0.1220 0.1043 0.0311 0.0993 0.1305
1993 0.2754 0.0756 0.0927 0.1072 -0.0022 0.1679 0.1097
1994 0.2735 0.0189 0.0542 0.2004 0.0190 0.1410 0.1136
1995 0.2734 0.0973 0.0517 0.1243 -0.0148 0.1781 0.1100
1996 0.3008 0.0773 0.0837 0.1397 -0.0062 0.2068 0.1002
1997 0.3399 0.0649 0.1460 0.1290 0.0352 0.1968 0.1079
1998 0.3753 0.0972 0.2258 0.0523 0.0220 0.2339 0.1193
1999 0.4243 0.0929 0.2138 0.1176 0.0434 0.2448 0.1362
2000 0.4048 0.0537 0.2140 0.1372 0.0481 0.2207 0.1361
2001 0.3524 0.0406 0.1923 0.1195 0.0158 0.2295 0.1071
2002 0.3356 0.0909 0.1314 0.1133 0.0302 0.1809 0.1245
2003 0.3196 0.1140 0.1240 0.0816 0.0243 0.1826 0.1127
NOTE.￿ Gross gap refers to ln(1 + G) (or lnWJ ￿ lnWA), Q refers to the human capital
component of the wage gap, D refers to the unexplained component, and S refers to the
occupational and industrial Segregation component. Results are based on wage equations
which include as regressors: schooling, experience, experience squared, marital status, period
of immigration, occupation ￿xed e⁄ects, and industry ￿xed e⁄ects. Figures of ￿gross gap￿
are slightly di⁄erent from previous tables, because we lose observations for which there is
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year
D, b*=b(A) D, b*=b(A), segregation
Figure 4: Unexplained Wage Gap, With and Without Occupations, ￿
￿ = ￿
A
for occupation and industry, the unexplained gap is virtually unchanged when ￿A is used,
but is diminished when ￿J is used instead. (These ￿gures are based on Tables 2 and 3.)
The unexplained wage gap might be an underestimate of the labor market discrimination.
This is true in so far as occupational segregation, a component which explains about a third
of the total gap, may well represent a form of labor market discrimination, manifested in
barriers to entry for higher-paying professions.
Over the study period we observe a slow but steady convergence in some of the important
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Figure 5: Unexplained Wage Gap, With and Without Occupations, ￿
￿ = ￿
J
23schooling gap between the groups declined from 3.1 in 1991 to 2.3 in 2003; the di⁄erence in
the average age of the workers declined from 5.5 in 1991 to 4.5 in 2003; and the di⁄erence in
the marriage rate among workers declined from 8% (with a greater portion of Jews married)
to -0.6% (with a greater portion of Arabs married). This convergence did not lead, however,
to a steady and clear decline of Q; the human capital component of the wage gap. This is
possible due to the nature of the year-to-year comparisons that we outline, where the change
in a speci￿c component of the gap is not predictive since the gross change is composed of
￿price￿(coe¢ cients) and ￿quantity￿changes in observable and unobservable characteristics
(Juhn et al. (1993)).
Singling out the part of the wage gap explained by schooling and experience, Table 4
reports the portion of the gross gap contributed by these two human capital components.
Although the human capital component, as a whole, explains an unsteady, and not always
large, portion of the wage gap, especially under the ￿civil rights￿experiment (￿
￿ = ￿J),19
Table 4 shows that eliminating schooling and experience di⁄erences alone can eliminate a
great part of the total wage gap. Under the ￿enrichment experiment￿this can be eliminating
the whole gap in 1991, 76% of it in 1995, 44% in 1999, and 58% in 2003. Very close ￿gures,
albeit a slightly smaller, are attained under the ￿civil rights experiment,￿namely 98% of the
gross gap in 1991, 69% in 1995, 46% in 1999, and 54% in 2003.20
19In the speci￿cation that controls for occupational segregation, the human capital component, Q; explains
about 0%￿ 10% of the gross wage gap, G; when ￿J is used, and 10%￿ 30% of G when ￿A is used.
20Table 4 is based on wage equations without occupation and industry ￿xed e⁄ects. A similar table, but
controlling for occupation and industry, is found in the appendix to this chapter (Table 11).
24Table 4: Contribution of Schooling and Experience to the Wage Gap
1991 1995 1999 2003
G 0.2190 100% 0.2740 100% 0.4242 100% 0.3248 100%
￿
￿ = ￿A :
Schooling 0.1916 0.1926 0.1663 0.1639
Experience 0.0361 0.0160 0.0215 0.0243
Total 0.2277 104.0% 0.2086 76.1% 0.1878 44.3% 0.1882 57.9%
￿
￿ = ￿J :
Schooling 0.1863 0.1753 0.1853 0.1676
Experience 0.0279 0.0140 0.0102 0.0061
Total 0.2142 97.8% 0.1893 69.1% 0.1955 46.1% 0.1737 53.5%
NOTE.￿ Results are based on wage equations without occupation and industry ￿xed e⁄ects. G is
the gross wage gap. ￿Schooling￿and ￿experience￿signify the wage gap contributed by Jewish-Arab
di⁄erences in these variables.
The table reveals a striking fact. Just bridging the Jewish-Arab schooling gap can elim-
inate more than 50% of the observed wage gap. Closing the experience gap only adds to
this ￿gure. These are straightforward policy tools￿ through providing and enhancing em-
ployment and schooling opportunities￿ which can be implemented immediately and have a
direct and observable e⁄ect. Notwithstanding, a large portion (20%￿ 60% when ￿
￿ = ￿A;
and 50%￿ 70% when ￿
￿ = ￿J) of the gross wage gap is still unexplained neither by human
capital di⁄erences, nor by occupational segregation. Assuming that any unobservable wage-
relevant variables vary only to a negligible degree between consecutive years, then we would
be bound to attribute any change in the unexplained wage gap between years to labor market
discrimination. The fact that during the years of converging characteristics the wage gap
was increasing, and vice versa, supports this claim.
25Table 5: Basic Selectivity-Corrected Wage Gap Decomposition
￿
￿ = ￿A ￿
￿ = ￿J
Year Gross Gap Q D Q D Selection
1991 0.2190 0.232 0.225 0.156 0.301 -0.238
1992 0.2634 0.127 0.413 0.105 0.434 -0.276
1993 0.2739 0.167 0.533 0.046 0.654 -0.426
1994 0.2747 0.216 0.677 0.056 0.836 -0.618
1995 0.274 0.189 0.339 0.049 0.479 -0.254
1996 0.3023 0.214 1.009 0.030 1.193 -0.921
1997 0.3427 0.219 0.874 0.099 0.994 -0.750
1998 0.3754 0.214 1.162 0.073 1.303 -1.001
1999 0.4242 0.183 0.695 0.084 0.794 -0.454
2000 0.4047 0.161 0.220 0.090 0.290 0.024
2001 0.3647 0.196 0.742 0.051 0.887 -0.573
2002 0.3385 0.259 0.735 0.088 0.905 -0.655
2003 0.3248 0.196 -0.051 0.079 0.065 0.181
NOTE.￿ Gross gap refers to ln(1 + G) (or lnWJ ￿ lnWA), Q refers to
the human capital component of the wage gap, D refers to the unexplained
component of the wage gap. Selection refers to the term ^ ￿J^ ￿J ￿ ^ ￿A^ ￿A,
estimating the component of the wage gap attributed to self-selection into
employment; see text for details. Results are based on wage equations
which include as regressors: schooling, experience, experience squared, mar-
ital status, period of immigration, and the Inverse Mills Ratio. Selection
is estimated using the two-steps Heckman procedure, where the selection
equation includes schooling, high school dropout, high school graduate,
some college, college graduate, beyond college education, age, squared age,
immigration period, marital status, and years since ￿rst marriage.
4.1 Selectivity Corrected Wage Gap Decomposition
Table 5 reports selectivity-corrected decomposition results. The decomposition is performed
according to equation (4), where the selection equation includes, among other wage-related
variables, dummies for high-school dropout, high-school graduate, some college, college grad-
uate, after college schooling; age, age squared, and the number of years since the ￿rst mar-
riage (zero for never married).
The Heckman selection procedure depends on the functional form assumed, and the
identi￿cation variables for labor market participation. Therefore, the evidence presented
26Table 6: Extended Selectivity-Corrected Wage Gap Decomposition
￿
￿ = ￿A ￿
￿ = ￿J
Year Gross Gap Q D S Q D S Selection
1991 0.2188 0.114 0.036 0.085 0.084 0.035 0.116 -0.016
1992 0.2609 0.042 0.232 0.110 0.039 0.215 0.129 -0.123
1993 0.2754 0.080 0.316 0.096 -0.014 0.419 0.087 -0.216
1994 0.2735 -0.001 0.240 0.185 0.003 0.321 0.100 -0.151
1995 0.2734 0.078 0.250 0.126 -0.028 0.384 0.098 -0.181
1996 0.3008 0.083 0.481 0.105 -0.021 0.612 0.078 -0.368
1997 0.3399 0.070 0.397 0.132 0.037 0.451 0.112 -0.259
1998 0.3753 0.081 0.428 0.076 0.020 0.447 0.117 -0.210
1999 0.4243 0.094 0.390 0.122 0.030 0.448 0.129 -0.182
2000 0.4048 0.047 0.152 0.126 0.043 0.143 0.140 0.080
2001 0.3524 0.037 0.340 0.117 0.018 0.369 0.107 -0.142
2002 0.3356 0.111 0.230 0.120 0.024 0.310 0.126 -0.125
2003 0.3196 0.125 0.018 0.079 0.016 0.101 0.105 0.098
NOTE.￿ Gross gap refers to ln(1 + G) (or lnWJ ￿ lnWA), Q refers to the human capital
component of the wage gap, D refers to the unexplained component of the wage gap, and S
refers to occupational and industrial Segregation. Selection refers to the term ^ ￿J^ ￿J ￿ ^ ￿A^ ￿A,
estimating the component of the wage gap attributed to self-selection into employment; see
text for details. Results are based on wage equations which include as regressors: schooling,
experience, experience squared, marital status, period of immigration, occupation ￿xed e⁄ects,
industry ￿xed e⁄ects, and the Inverse Mills Ratio. Selection is estimated using the two-steps
Heckman procedure, where the selection equation includes schooling, high school dropout, high
school graduate, some college, college graduate, beyond college education, age, squared age,
immigration period, marital status, and years since ￿rst marriage.
here shall be taken as suggestive and by no means authoritative. That said, the table shows
a generally negative selection component. A negative ￿ selectivity e⁄ect￿suggests that Arabs
are more positively, or less negatively, selected into the labor market than Jews. Thus,
accounting for the selectivity e⁄ect, if negative, will yield higher unexplained wage gaps￿
which is also evident from the table below. Table 6 shows similar evidence, when reporting
the occupational segregation component.
The tables show, in general, that Arabs are positively self-selected into employment, or
at least to a greater tune than their Jewish counterparts. Therefore, for the same human
capital and occupational distribution di⁄erences￿ whose e⁄ects are very similar to those
27derived earlier, without selectivity correction￿ a higher portion of the wage gap will be un-
explained. This may suggest that the uncorrected wage decomposition might underestimate
the unexplained, or discriminatory, wage gap.
Unlike the volatile selection measures from Table 5, Table 6 shows that the change in
the selection of workforce does not seem likely to be a major concern in measuring the gaps.
The Arab-Jewish ratio of observable human capital components was stable, and at times
converging, in the study period (see Table 1). This also shows that there are no major
changes in the selection of workforce. The Arab-Jewish ratio in the variable ￿years since ￿rst
marriage,￿for married workers, ranged between 0.8￿ 0.9 with a slightly downward sloping
trend (see Figure 6). Along this dimension, the Arab positive self-selection seems to be very
slightly increasing.
4.2 Quality of Schooling
In previous analyses I assumed that human capital variables are comparable. Schooling is an
important example where this may not be the case. That is, given the segregated schooling
system in Israel￿ each of Arabs and Jews have their own schools, despite all being bound to
the Ministry of Education￿ it may be persuasively claimed that the quality of schooling is
better in the well-endowed Jewish sector.
Since, in the income datasets at hand, there is no information about the type of schools
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Figure 6: Arab-Jewish years-since-￿rst-marriage Ratio, Married Workers
29with some college education or above (and, alternatively, with college degree or above). The
notion behind this exercise is simple. If school quality is lower in the Arab sector, then
any wage gap between Jewish and Arab workers with the same years of schooling will be
mistakenly attributed to labor market discrimination (or unexplained gap), other things
being equal. This means that the unexplained gap (D) will be overestimated. If that is
true, then once we restrict the sample to some college/college graduates or above￿ where
the higher schooling system is identical, as Arabs and Jews attend the very same universities
and colleges￿ the portion of the unexplained gap from the total wage gap should be lower
than that in the unrestricted sample.
I ￿nd no evidence of the sort. In fact, I ￿nd that, in the highly educated restricted
sample, the portion of the unexplained gap from the total gap is higher than that from the
unrestricted sample, almost in each year. This is true whether the Arab or the Jewish wage
structure is used as the nondiscriminatory wage norm (i.e., whether ￿
￿ = ￿A or ￿
￿ = ￿J);
also it is true whether the sample is restricted to 13 years of schooling and above or to 15
years of schooling (college degree) or above. Figure 7 shows the results for the di⁄erent
samples and using ￿
￿ = ￿A: This preliminary evidence suggests that the quality of schooling
is not at stake, and therefore my previous decompositions are robust to this concern.21
The above illustration does not imply that early-age gaps, in school quality and other
21In the working version of this study I also show evidence that the unexplained wage gap increased with
education (Asali (2006)). Levanon and Raviv (2007) also show that the unexplained gap increases with
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Figure 7: Portion of the Unexplained Gap from the Gross Gap, by Years of Schooling.
￿
￿ = ￿A
31skills, are not carried into the future. In fact, ample evidence in the literature shows that
gaps at early ages are not only carried into the labor market but are even exacerbated in the
future (Carneiro et al. (2005)). Neither does this exercise imply that college graduates are
perfectly homogenous. Rather, in limiting the sample to workers who attend the very same
educational institution, and thus experience literally the same school quality, this exercise
shows that the unexplained wage gap￿ which potentially may be the result of unmeasured
human capital di⁄erences such as school quality￿ is not decreased. This result, while not
eliminating the concern about the e⁄ect of school quality, suggests that school quality is not
likely to be the major factor driving the gaps, and thus is not a major concern in measuring
and decomposing these gaps.
4.3 Wage Distribution
It is interesting to know who was driving the increase in the wage gap during the 1990s. Is it
skilled Jewish workers (i.e., at the top of the wage distribution) who gain more, or unskilled
Arab workers at the bottom of the distribution who lose more. Figure 8 tells a striking
story. The ￿gure plots the change in the average log real wage (which is approximated by
the percentage change in real wage) between the years 1991 and 1999, by percentile. The
positive slope of the data points means that the inequality within group has increased during
this period: real wages of higher income individuals increased more than individuals at the
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Figure 8: Change in Log Real Wage by Percentile, 1991￿ 1999
33The striking fact about the ￿gure, beside that at each percentile in the distribution, the
Jewish wages increase by a higher percentage than the Arab wages, is that about 80% of the
Arab workers have a lower wage in 1999 than in 1991. The previously shown increase in the
wage gap is actually experienced by individuals from the whole distribution.
The fastest growing industry in Israel, after 1995, was the high-tech industry. Since
almost all of the high-tech ￿rms in Israel are Jewish owned, it is unlikely that Arabs bene￿t
from this boom (Levanon and Raviv (2007)). Therefore, what may have been happening in
Israel in the late 1990s can be described as ￿skill-biased technical change.￿However, it seems
that Arabs missed the opportunity, mainly due to barriers to entry to these ￿rms which were
￿ercely pushing the economy ahead. Figure 9 shows that highly educated Jews bene￿ted
more than the low educated Jews, and higher skill workers (higher in the distribution) gained
more than low-skilled ones.
There are not enough highly-educated Arab observations in the sample in 1991 to draw
statistical inference. However, using all available data, Figure 10 shows that, while about
80% of the Arab workers experienced a loss in wages, the skilled ones bene￿ted more (or
were harmed less). The striking result in the graph is that highly educated Arabs not only
did not bene￿t from the technological boom of the 1990s as their Jewish counterparts, but
were harmed even more than the low-educated Arabs. This is suggestive as to the e⁄ect of
the high-tech boom of the 1990s. Arabs being excluded from the lucrative top jobs, Jewish
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Figure 10: Change in Log Real Wage by Percentile and Education, Arabs, 1991￿ 1999
365 Concluding Remarks
This study measures and documents the Jewish-Arab wage di⁄erential, and its evolution, in
the Israeli labor market in the years 1991￿ 2003. Many reasons can be adduced in explanation
of wage di⁄erentials in the labor market. More so for Israel whose economy is subject to
so great a variety of pressures. Israel has experienced rapid and large-scale changes in
the composition of its workforce over the 1990s. The large in￿ ux of foreign workers, the
Oslo peace process, massive inward migration, and the breakout of the second Intifada,
while events in the political sphere, have all had their impact on the country￿ s economy,
precipitating shifts in the wage gap and its constituent parts as analyzed. This study sought
to illuminate this gap in terms of productivity-related di⁄erentials, on the one hand, and
labor market segregation and, possibly, discrimination, on the other.
That the Jewish-Arab wage gap reached an alarming pitch is beyond question. It is like-
wise impossible to maintain anything other than that the immense observed labor market
wage gap is an indication of the existence of some labor market friction or failure (whether
segregation, disintegration, or discrimination). The appropriate way to measure this discrim-
ination is, however, a matter of controversy. In this study, I used standard decomposition
methods, with occupational distribution and selectivity correction introduced, to measure
the human capital, occupational segregation, and a residual component that may re￿ ect
labor market discrimination.
I ￿nd that the Jewish-Arab hourly wage gap hovered at around 40% (of Arab hourly
37wage) in the years 1991￿ 1994, peaking at 64% in 1999. Since then the hourly wage gap
has decreased, falling to 43% by the end of 2003. The unexplained component of the gap,
resulting from di⁄erent returns to human capital ingredients, accounted for 10%￿ 20% of the
overall wage gap in the beginning of the period but increased vastly during the late 1990s
to explain more than 60% of the gap. Occupational segregation explained 30%￿ 40% of the
overall wage gap over the entire period. The sum of the occupational segregation component
and the unexplained component explains most of the observed gap, however it is di¢ cult to
discern the part of this sum which obtains due to pure labor market discrimination.
One main policy implication is that bridging the schooling gap can eliminate about one-
to two-thirds of the wage gap￿ despite the ￿human capital￿component being smaller than
that in some cases; this is because there are other factors in the human capital which have
negative e⁄ect on the wage, such as being unmarried, new immigrant, and the like which
reduces the share of this component as a whole. Moreover, breaching barriers to entry￿
which can also be related to the schooling gap￿ to di⁄erent lucrative industries can eliminate
more than third of the total wage gap. This is also about breaking the vicious circle, where
Arabs choose to underinvest in education as long as they are not allowed into high-paying,
skilled jobs.
Arabs are found to be more positively, or less negatively, selected into employment. This
￿nding implies that the estimate of the unexplained gap is understated. In other words,
had there been no Arab positive selection, the observed wage gap would have been higher.
38Moreover, the study shows that there are large ￿ uctuations in the wage gap. Because sudden
changes in the wage gap are not likely to result from sudden changes in the underlying
characteristics of the populations, and in fact many of the key (observable) characteristics
were converging in the study period, this result suggests that a large part of the levels and
changes in the wage gap are likely to be due to labor market discrimination.
A A Note on the Gross Wage Gap G
Note that, since G values in this study are very large (can reach 0.42), the approximation used
in the discrimination literature, namely, that ln(1 + G) = G; is not very accurate in this case.
Also, note that, since G is de￿ned as G = lnWJ ￿ lnWA; it is representing the geometric
wage di⁄erential, and not the simple arithmetic one￿ to which I allude when describing





















= ln(1 + g) ￿ g; where ~ W is the geometric average of hourly wage, and
g is the geometric wage gap.
For example, take the year 2003. In this year the average hourly wage for Jews and Arabs
is ￿ WJ = 43:6 and ￿ WA = 30:4: Therefore, the wage gap is 43:4% (43:6=30:4 ￿ 1 = 0:434).
The corresponding geometric average hourly wage is ~ WJ = 36:6 and ~ WA = 26:4; therefore
the geometric wage gap (g) is 38:6%: Tables in the main text show that G = 0:3248; which
is way below g = :386: (Or ~ g = exp(:3248) ￿ 1 = 0:384).






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































42C Schooling and Experience Contribution to the Wage
Gap
Table 11: Contribution of Schooling and Experience to the Wage Gap, within Occupations
1991 1995 1999 2003
G 0.2188 100% 0.2734 100% 0.4243 100% 0.3196 100%
￿
￿ = ￿A :
Schooling 0.0678 0.0898 0.0800 0.0902
Experience 0.0255 0.0095 0.0135 0.0186
Total 0.0933 42.6% 0.0993 36.3% 0.0936 22.1% 0.1089 34.1%
￿
￿ = ￿J :
Schooling 0.1052 0.0762 0.1061 0.0798
Experience 0.0223 0.0122 0.0097 0.0077
Total 0.1275 58.3% 0.0884 32.3% 0.1158 27.3% 0.0875 27.4%
NOTE.￿ Results are based on wage equations with occupation and industry ￿xed e⁄ects. G is
the gross wage gap. ￿Schooling￿and ￿experience￿signify the wage gap contributed by Jewish-
Arab di⁄erences in these variables.
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